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I contemplate the antinomy between the cultural relativism and universalism and the ways how 
to surpass this relationship. I assess the problematic within the scope of anthropology, and 
include certain philosophical/political debate. I approach the issue from both cultural relativistic 
and universalist position. I introduce both cultural relativism and universalism concepts with 
their related discussions, followed by dialectical approach to ‘concrete universal’. I provide 
historical background of the concept of cultural relativism and also discuss the related concept of 
‘culture’, which I analyze in critical examination of the terms essentialism, identity politics and 
multiculturalism. Then, I examine the concept of human rights in relation to anthropology, 
universalism and cultural relativism as a potential candidate to reconcile this binary. After, I 
briefly discuss anti anti-relativism. I conclude with idea that recuperates cultural relativism 
through the perspective of universalism. 
 
 
Key words: cultural relativism, universalism, culture, essentialism, concrete universal, 













Table of Contents 
 
1. Introduction: Comparison and Context ................................................................................... 1 
2. Part I. “Everything is General in General but Particular in Particular”: Cultural Relativism 
and Universalism ............................................................................................................................ 3 
2.1. Cultural Relativism .......................................................................................................... 3 
2.2. Universalism..................................................................................................................... 6 
2.3. Concrete Universality ....................................................................................................... 8 
2.3.1. Attaining Universality through the Particular ......................................................... 13 
3. Part II ..................................................................................................................................... 15 
3.1. Culture, Difference, and the Way Cultural Relativism Idea has Developed.................. 15 
3.1.1. Culture and Difference ............................................................................................ 18 
3.2. Cultural Relativism’s Political/Intellectual Descendants ............................................... 20 
3.2.1. Identity Politics ....................................................................................................... 22 
3.2.2. Multiculturalism ...................................................................................................... 25 
4. Part III. Human Rights........................................................................................................... 29 
4.1. Vicissitudes of Human Rights ........................................................................................ 29 
4.1.1. The common misunderstandings of the concept of ‘culture’ and its consequences 
for human rights..................................................................................................................... 31 
4.1.2. Instrumentalization of the language ........................................................................ 34 
5. Anti anti-relativism ................................................................................................................ 39 
6. Conclusion ............................................................................................................................. 42 










1. Introduction: Comparison and Context 
 
 
Distinguishing between cultural relativism and universalism, and the complex ways in which 
they crosscut, is the gist of this essay. Although seemingly two opposing terms, cultural 
relativism and universalism are not going to be presumed as entirely antagonistic. Most briefly, 
cultural relativism is an anthropological approach in which actions in particular culture should 
not be judged based on the values of another, for they are all ’correct’ in relation to their 
respective cultural norms. While on the other hand, in universalism, something general is sought, 
a basis for collective authenticity of men, something where the same principles can be applied to 
all mankind. In this thesis, I look closely to the debates surrounding the issues of cultural 
relativism and universalism, while I also provide reasoning for the third approach, i.e.to look for 
the commonalities in the concepts of cultural relativism and universalism and to reconcile them.  
Before I continue with the discussion, I first present the outline of the structure of this essay. 
After a brief introduction to the issue of cultural relativism and universalism, I give a detailed 
explanation of both terms. The part about universalism is somewhat longer, because I have 
introduced the concept not just as an anthropological, but also as philosophical-political 
category, exemplified in Slavoj Žižek’s dialectical approach to concrete universal (Žižek 1999). 
In the second part of the essay, I continue with the discussion about cultural relativism, provide a 
historical background of the concept and also discuss the related concept of ‘culture.’ After that, 
I provide a critical examination of the terms such as essentialism, identity politics and 
multiculturalism in order to show how both cultural relativist and universalist approaches 
function when they are put in practice. 
In the third part, I analyze the concept of human rights in relation to anthropology, universalism, 
as well as cultural relativism and the surrounding problematics. I particularly focus on two 
human rights critiques by Sally Engle Merry (2003) and Kirsten Hastrup (2003), which I analyze 
in light of Žižek’s theories. 
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In the last part, I include a brief discussion of the anti anti-relativism, introduced by Clifford 
Geertz (1984), whose concept recuperates cultural relativism through the perspective of 
universalism. 
A presentation and reconciliation of the cultural relativism–universalism binary follows the 
Hegelian triadic process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis: essentialism of abstract or neutral 
universalism as the thesis, anti-essentialism of multiculturalism and identity politics as the 
antithesis, and anti anti-essentialism of concrete universality as the synthesis of the two. In this 
discussion, I explain why these terms are important, and what are the main issues and questions 
related to them. 
Although cultural relativism is in a much closer stand to my personal views, I argue that the 
current global social and political situation dictates some kind of a common language across 
cultures if the humanity wants to progressively deal with global issues, such as environmental 
threats, and economic, racial, and gender inequality, to mention only few. I endeavor to 
understand whether the human rights discourse can provide such a universal common point, 
without renouncing the cultural relativist perspective. I find this topic relevant from 
anthropological stand point because anthropology cannot just detach itself from these current 
socio-political issues as a neutral by-stander, but also because the debate about cultural 
relativism and universalism also points to the adequate understanding of the current humanity: 
we cannot limit ourselves anymore to separate cultures, but we have to study cultural phenomena 










2. Part I. “Everything is General in General but 
Particular in Particular”: Cultural Relativism and 
Universalism 
 
  Clifford Geertz 
(Geertz 1983:150) 
     
         The main idea of this text is a contemplation of a relationship between cultural relativism 
and universalism, or in the words of Thomas Hylland Eriksen: “to what extent do all humans, 
cultures or societies have something in common, and to what extent is each of them unique?” 
(Eriksen 2001:5). The conceptual and ethical tension among the two carries a particular weight 
in anthropology, as well as in other social sciences. These two concepts are usually presented as 
binary opposites, both implicitly or explicitly laden with value, and exclusive to each other. A 
venture into the territory of relativism often leads to a categorical rejection of universalism. 
Moreover, universalism is often ill-defined. Its diverse meanings and political potentials are not 
recognized and are often misunderstood. To understand this problematic better, I provide 
detailed accounts of both concepts. 
 
 
2.1. Cultural Relativism 
 
    Scholars recognize different types of cultural relativism. For instance, they differentiate 
between cognitive or epistemological cultural relativism, and moral or cultural one (Barnard and 
Spencer 1996:478).In both of them, there is an emphasis or notion that most things we do, as 
humans, are relative to each other. Scholars, who are dealing with these concepts, deny that there 
is a viewpoint which is uniquely privileged more than any other.  
    Among these different kinds of relativisms, cultural relativism is a method favored in 
anthropology (Barnard and Spencer 1996). Anthropologists in support of the cultural relativism 
believe that actions in particular culture should not be judged based on the criteria from another 
culture. They see the cultural diversity as the essence of humankind and treat all cultural world 
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views as equally valuable in order to understand them better and to use that knowledge for the 
advancement of anthropological discipline. Hence, it is inappropriate to think in terms of 
hierarchy between cultures, because different cultures have different priorities and values.  
An implication that all people from all over the world are equally human was not widely 
accepted historically. Even today, in some parts in the world exist the negation of universal 
equality among people endures. It was common for white, middle class, male, and heterosexual 
Europeans to perceive ‘others’ as inferior, based on their skin color, gender, sexuality, and class. 
For instance, one of the biggest sport figures of the twentieth century – the recently deceased 
Muhammad Ali – after winning Olympic gold medal in Rome in 1960i was refused to be served 
in the restaurant owned by ‘white’ people. The reason was simple as it was incomprehensible: 
racism.  
One of the first advocates of anti-racism in anthropological field was Franz Boas, often called a 
‘Father of American Anthropology.’ His reaction to racism was the following: “No one has ever 
proved that a human being, through his descent from a certain group of people, must of necessity 
have certain mental characteristics” (Boas 1945:52). His main idea of fighting chauvinism, 
racism and ethnocentrism is ‘historical particularism,’ which claims that individual cultures 
should not be compared hierarchically, but studied in their own regard (Kottak 2011:296). Boas’ 
new way of looking at culture was also a form of cultural relativism.  
Cultural relativists’ main tool is ethnography, or doing “fieldwork in a particular cultural setting” 
(Kottak 2011:9). The aim of cultural relativists is to understand foreign societies without 
prejudices, which is best achieved through the emic perspective, i.e., taking into account the 
native’s point of view.  
       Unfortunately, cultural relativist position bears certain limits. This point of view works fine 
until cultural relativists face human rights violations. One of the often cited examples among 
anthropologists regarding harmful ‘traditional’ practices, such as female genital mutilation 
(FGM), is used as an exemplary case often used against the concept of cultural relativism. 
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Merrilee H. Salmon, for instance, states that anthropologists should abandon the position of 
scholarly observers and should get involved and work on the elimination of these abusive 
practices, and to criticize and challenge them (Salmon 1997).  
But such extreme cultural relativist positions, which are indifferent to the risky practices, are not 
necessary the only way how cultural relativism can be employed. In the current anthropological 
literature, for example, cultural relativism is usually understood as a methodological position: 
“Anthropologists employ cultural relativism not as a moral belief but as a methodological 
position: In order to understand another culture fully, we must try to understand how the people 
in that culture see things” (Kottak 2011:39). A position which evaluates child labor as 
nonjudgmentally as volunteering in Red Cross exists only in theory. Salmon criticizes this 
position which seems to maintain neutral stance on anything in order to comprehend all cultures 
on equal grounds, without criticizing them, or seeking to improve them. However, 
anthropologists who are doing their fieldwork are not following this principle blindly. Scholars 
can still be relativists, but that does not mean they have to approve of or be indifferent toward 
social injustice or human rights abuses in different cultures. In summary, cultural relativism is 
not a moral belief, but is employed as a methodological position for the purpose of better 
understanding of other cultures. 
For example, Merry is one of the anthropologists who explains that cultural relativism position is 
misinterpreted, because both the anthropologist’s stance and the concept of culture are often 
misconceived among the general population (Merry 2003). Lila Abu-Lughod makes a similar, if 
not the same point by saying that a way of presenting and analyzing culture as something static, 
homogenous, and independent is wrong. Culture is dynamic, adaptive and porous, and it must be 
studied in that manner, so that everyone gets a better picture of what cultural relativism stands 
for (Abu-Lughod 1991). By misunderstanding the concept of culture, one misunderstands the 
cultural relativism. 
I discuss this further in one of the following chapters of this essay. Even so, I would recommend 
using a culturally relativistic lenses to understand the methodology of why certain practices and 
beliefs work for a particular culture, and then, to use one’s own set of morals and values to 






        
         The ideas of cultural relativists are often contrasted with the ideas of scholars propagating 
universalism. Cultural relativists stand for diversity of people and their cultures as the essence to 
humankind. The universalists are doing the opposite – they emphasize the similarities within the 
humankind (Eriksen 2001:8). They are stating that there are essential human values and patterns 
common to all existing cultures. Out of those common patterns, they are making grand cross-
cultural theories, which are supposed to explain the nature of man. 
In this text, I discuss universalism from both anthropological and philosophical-political 
perspective. 
One of the proponents of universalism in anthropology is Donald Brown. According to him, 
“universals at the level of the individual are particularly likely to be close to human nature or to 
be actual elements of human nature - at the core of which are the evolved problem-solving 
mechanisms that constitute the human mind” (Brown 2004:48). Brown (1991) elaborates on 
already established distinction between universal, the generalized, and the particular: “Certain 
biological, psychological, social, and cultural features are universal – shared by all human 
populations. Others are merely generalized – common to several but not all human groups. Still 
others are particular – not shared at all” (Kottak 2011:35; emphases added). This statement is 
questionable, especially from the cultural relativist point of view: we are not able to seize and 
completely understand psychological traits, social features and cultural meanings each particular 
culture that exists in this world. Because of that, it is very hard, if not impossible, to list and 
compare them without imposing an ethnocentric perspective.1 
                                                          
1 Ethnocentrism, usually contrasted with cultural relativism, represents belief that one’s culture is superior to other 
cultures (Kottak 2011:53). 
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“Cultural universals” are cultural traits presumably shared across all cultures, for instance 
exogamy2 and incest taboo3. In my opinion, cultures should not be evaluated based on their 
similarities: there are always exceptions and deviations from standards which should not be 
omitted. These ‘similarities’ function differently within different cultures: Ruth Benedict 
emphasized this point that cultures are uniquely patterned and integrated in her famous book 
Patterns of Culture (Kottak 2011:298). Universalists are sometimes simplifying complex cultural 
concepts, reducing them to the patterns they are later able to compare with similar concepts from 
‘other’ cultures, making them appear universally homogenous.  
In his earlier scholarly phase, Geertz believed that “universals are empty containers that give an 
illusion of similarity where there is dramatic variation” (Beck and Maida 2015:277). However, in 
his essay The Impact of the Concept of Culture on the Concept of Man (1973), Geertz does not 
disregard completely universalist viewpoints, or universalism as such. In The New York Times 
magazine article about Geertz’s book The Interpretation of Cultures (1973) a journalist writes: 
“In one direction is the world of culture, diverse and unimaginably complex. In the other is the 
world of nature, immutable and universal. And though Mr. Geertz has now spent many years on 
the faculty at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, his career has been spent following 
one path while trying to hold the other in view.”ii Geertz accepts that there is something universal 
between cultures, but contemplates on how to approach this question scientifically. 
Geertz suggests in this regard that: first, universals can be found in every culture everywhere, but 
the scientists should approach this task ‘empirically’; and second, after these conditions are met, 
cultural universals can be successfully connected with the “established constants” of human life 
(Geertz 1973:38). By ‘established constants’ of human life, Geertz refers to biological, 
psychological, and social layers, the conceptions of human life which are constant and can be 
studied empirically.4 Following from this premise, scholars can explore which cultural traits are 
essential for all human lives (Geertz 1973:38). 
                                                          
2 Practice of marrying someone outside of one’s community (Kottak 2011:34). 
3 Incest: “Incest and its prohibition or avoidance are closely related social phenomena”. Some anthropologists 
oppose this view (Barnard and Spencer 2010:371). 
4 Those mentioned layers of human life are assigned and inarguable. Geertz also calls them ‘stratigraphic’ elements, 
in sense that man is to be ‘hierarchically stratified animal’ (Geertz 1973:37).  
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Contemplating universalism, Geertz first considers the religion as a possible candidate for 
cultural universals, but he soon discards the, because “the obsessive ritualism and unbuttoned 
polytheism of the Hindus and ... the uncompromising monotheism and austere legalism of Sunni 
Islam” are too different (Geertz 1973:40).  
In his distinguished text based on 1984 lecture Anti Anti-Relativism, Geertz makes an effort to 
defend the idea of cultural relativism, and at the same time to mock universalists, and other anti-
relativists, implicitly saying that their statements can lead to class and race discrimination: 
“Whatever cultural relativism may be or originally have been (and there is not one of its critics in 
a hundred who has got that right), it serves these days largely as a specter to scare us away from 
certain ways of thinking or toward others” (Geertz 1984:263). By “certain ways of thinking or 
toward others” (Geertz 1984:263) Geertz refers to chauvinism and racism and other ethnocentric 
beliefs. Our history has shown us that universalistic position can lead to disaster. We do not need 
to go as far as the 19th century when humanity was divided into ‘civilized men’ and ‘savages’ to 
make a point. It is enough to look back to Nazi Germany to see how ethnocentric beliefs had 
dreadful consequences in Europe. Even more recent examples are ‘ethnic cleansings’ in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Rwanda, events from just two decades ago. 
 
 
2.3. Concrete Universality 
 
Slavoj Žižek, a contemporary Slovenian philosopher and cultural critic also discusses the idea of 
universalism (Žižek, 1999), but from a more philosophical and political perspective, which is, as 
I argue here, also important for the anthropological discussion about cultural relativism and 
universalism.  
Žižek finds ‘neutral universality’ (a phrase coined by himself), represented in the form of 
common features shared by all of humanity, as a false universality. However, referring to Hegel, 
he suggests another type of universality, termed ‘concrete universality,’ which is more useful for 
him in light of current philosophical and political debates.  
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         In his book The Ticklish subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (1999), Žižek 
discusses Hegel’s distinction between ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ universality.  The reason I 
endeavor to overcome this complex relationship between the concrete and abstract universal 
outlined by Žižek (and Hegel)5 lays in the resemblance of this particular distinction with the 
relationship between cultural relativism and universalism. Consequently, the dialectical approach 
to articulate the ‘true concrete universality’ represents the dialectical relationship between 
cultural relativism and universalism. 
Thus, I am going to present a succinct version of the Hegelian opposition between ‘concrete’ and 
‘abstract’ universality, followed by interpretation of Žižek’s own ideas.  
      The most important distinction between concrete and abstract universality is related to their 
names – concrete universality is universality that is manifested in a concrete and particular 
situation; while abstract universality represents its opposite, something not concretely specified, 
existing only in the form of an abstract concept. However, concrete universality, in Hegel’s 
dialectic, derives from abstract universality, with the progression from thesis (a thing ‘in itself’), 
through antithesis (a thing ‘for itself’), to synthesis (a thing ‘in and for itself’). 
In his book, Žižek demonstrates how the abstract universality is transformed into concrete 
universality with Hegel’s example of ‘individualization through secondary identification’ (Žižek 
1999:90). He identifies primary identification in the example of family membership (thesis), as 
an ‘organic’ community, governed by ‘spontaneous’ relationships.’ Secondary identification, on 
the other hand, exists in the form of national citizenship (antithesis, also ‘abstract’ universality), 
as an ‘artificial’, or abstract community consistent of mediated relationships among its 
members.6 
However, in Hegel’s dialectic, this binary scheme between thesis and antithesis is reconciled 
through the process of synthesis. Universal secondary identification thus becomes concrete 
universality only “when it reintegrates primary identifications, transforming them into the modes 
of appearance of the secondary identification (say, precisely by being a good member of my 
                                                          
5Based on Žižek’s argument that Hegel was misinterpreted on this issue by his critics. 
6 Another example of the secondary and primary identifications presented through the contrast between Plato’s 
Euthyphro and Antigone6: Euthyphro prosecutes his own father for the death of their servant. In this case, Euthyphro 
forsakes his family in favor of the universality of law. In contrast, Antigone renounces her civic obligations in favor 
of her familial obligations. 
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family, I thereby contribute to the proper functioning of my nation-state)” (Žižek 1999:90). 
Žižek explains this process further in the following way: “Therein lies the Hegelian difference 
between 'abstract' and 'concrete' universality: the universal secondary' identification remains 
'abstract' in so far as it is directly opposed to the particular forms of primary identification – that 
is, in so far as it compels the subject to renounce his primary identifications; it becomes 
‘concrete’ when it reintegrates primary identifications, transforming them into the modes of 
appearance of the secondary identification” (Žižek 1999:90). Individual thus becomes a true and 
autonomous individual only when he or she not only opposes his primary identification (family, 
as thesis) through secondary identification (nation, as antithesis; also as abstract universality), 
but foremost when successfully reintegrates both of them through the process of synthesis into a 
form of concrete universality. 
Žižek gives another example of how this works with reference to religion: being a good Christian 
in the realm of Christianity (as abstract universality), is achieved through the opposition to 
existing social order (as thesis, opposed by Christianity as its antithesis); concrete universalism is 
thus only achieved through the process of synthesis of both realms when a good Christian 
partakes in the social world around himself (synthesis of thesis and antithesis), and incorporates 
himself or herself into social order (Žižek 1999:91).  
With this interpretation of Hegel’s examples, Žižek commences his dialectical process aimed at 
finding a ‘true’ concrete universal, which can be useful for today’s socio-political situation. This 
concept of ‘true’ concrete universal is for him precisely that kind of universalism that I find 
useful for the main discussion in this essay. For that reason, I present here the intellectual efforts 
to designate the ‘true’ concrete universality:  
Žižek presents three versions of concrete universality, as defined by various scholars and 
philosophers and establishes a relationship between the universal and its particular content 
(Žižek 1999: 100-101): 
1. ‘Neutral universality’: Cartesian cogito, same in everyone, regardless to gender, ethnicity 
etc. This concept of universality is completely indifferent to its content; 
2. ‘Symptomatic universality’: Here, previous ‘neutral universality’ is exposed. It shows 
that particular content, e.g. a white male property owner, is hidden behind this ‘neutral’ 
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universality. Expected neutral content, e.g. some ‘true’ universality of a modern 
individual is therefore not expressed here. ‘Symptomatic’ universality is identify in this 
sense as a symptom of a form of domination that has an interest in disabling particular 
differences behind the appearance of neutrality, which is in favor of a particular 
subjectivity. This universality is an ideological falsehood, ideological illusion, and a mere 
facade. This universality is not included in all if its particulars so it does not fulfill 
Žižek’s notion of concrete universality.7 
3. ‘Hegemonized8 universality,’ exemplified by Ernesto Laclau9: universality is purely 
formal, empty, and it needs to be filled with a particular content. It is ‘empty’ 
universality, and it can be only hegemonized by a particular content that will act in its 
place as the universal. Žižek interprets this universal as “the battleground on which the 
multitude of particular content fight for hegemony” (Žižek 1999:101). This is an open-
ended concept, never-ending in its application, and as such, always open for ‘re-
hegemonization.’ The main character of this universal is the struggle for its 
hegemonization.  
Žižek is critical of all three options, because universal, as understood in all three cases, is always 
a particular (hegemonic) subjectivity disguised as universal: “The Universal always asserts itself 
in the guise of some particular content which claims to embody it directly, excluding all other 
content as merely particular" (Žižek 1999: 101). In order for the universality to become ‘true 
concrete’ universality, it cannot remain separate or indifferent from its particular content, but 
must include itself among its particulars (Žižek, 1999:92). 
Žižek proceeds with his search and explanation of the ‘true’ concrete universality that can at the 
same time negate (antithesis) and reconcile (synthesis) with the existing social order. This two-
step progression is achieved in the following way. In the first part, the social order is negated 
through political struggle, which then enables “post-revolutionary reconciliation between 
demands of social Order and the abstract freedom of individual” (Žižek 1999:94). Significantly, 
this “reconciliation” is an ambiguous term – “it designates reconciliation of a split (the healing of 
                                                          
7 If the male property owner is not occupying the universal, then any particular stand in is good as any other. 
8 Hegemony: Dominance or forced leadership, usually by one country over the other. Hegemon is the dominating 
leader.   
9 Political theorist.  
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the wound of the social body), as well as the reconciliation with this split as the necessary price 
of individual freedom” (Žižek 1999:95). In this sense, the reconciliation is never total, and there 
always exists a ‘gap’ or ‘split’ that demands further political action. In this way, the ‘true’ 
concrete universality is “forever prevented from acquiring a figure that would be adequate to its 
notion” and “there is universality only in so far as there is a gap,” Žižek concludes (Žižek 
1999:103). 
Žižek argues further that the logic of concrete universality, outlined by Hegel, was 
misinterpreted by the late 19th century Hegelians, as they were “demanding the identification of 
each individual with his/her specific post within the defined and hierarchical Whole of the global 
[universal] social body” (Žižek 1999:94).   
Žižek says that ‘true’ concrete universality is not a neutral medium for a particular content, as a 
kind of “mute universality” – something we all have in common (Žižek 1991:91),i.e., cultural 
universals in anthropology. Universality in its actual existence has to be individuality (Žižek 
1991:91). Actualization of universal is when the subject is “asserted as unique and irreducible to 
the particular concrete totality” (Žižek 1991:91), and this can only happen through ‘active 
intervention’: “Substance is praxis, active intervention; while Subject is theoria, passive 
intuition” (Žižek 1991:91). In this sense, ‘true concrete’ universality is not an ‘expression’ of a 
pre-existent abstract universality, but a ‘performative’ actualization of concrete universality 
through a constitutive ‘event.’10 
Žižek further illustrates this in his reference to the difference between Greek Reminiscence and 
Christian Repetition (Žižek 1999:212). This opposition originally commented by Kierkegaard: 
Socratic philosophical principle of the reminiscence is the idea that truth/knowledge is huddled 
in us, and we to rediscover it, as the inscription in Delphi reads: know thyself; and Christian idea 
                                                          
10 To exemplify the ‘true’ concrete universality, Žižek implicitly refers to the paradigm of ‘performative’, which 
Judith Butler, philosopher and gender theorist, develops in her books Gender Trouble (1990) and Bodies That 
Matter (1993), in which she challenges the conventional notions of gender. According to Butler, ‘performativity’ is 
understood “not as the act by which a subject brings into being … but, rather, as that reiterative power of discourse 
to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (Butler 1993:2). Her point is that gender is a dynamic 
notion, sequence of acts, not something ascribed (Butler 1990:25). In this case ‘gender’ represents the ‘true’ 
concrete universal. As “there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender; that identity is performatively 
constituted by the very “expressions” that are said to be its results” (Butler 1990:25). Expressionist model represents 
the realization of imagined and pre-existing abstract universality. What Butler argues for is the contrary, that gender 
is constituted through a ‘performance’ in a particular moment. 
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of revelation where truth/knowledge is not inherent but imposed in the moment (Žižek 
1999:212).  
In Repetition there is some kind of abrupt action, assertion which Žižek calls the ‘Event’, 
“something violently imposed on me from the Outside” (Žižek 1999:212), that constitutes 
universality at one particular moment—in this sense, universality is not ‘expression’ of some 
preexisting universality, but is constituted ‘performatively’ in the moment (contrary to the re-
discovery of Reminisance). Žižek emphasizes this moment, the Event, which is necessity for 
emergence of the ‘true’ concrete universal. It is like the moment of negation of all particular 
content: it has to emerge in order for universality to become truly universal. At the same time, 
that moment is the one preventing actualization to happen. Therein lays the ‘gap’. It has to be 




2.3.1. Attaining Universality through the Particular 
 
        
          Žižek approaches concrete universality further from the perspective of the particular. For 
Žižek, true concrete universality can be attained only through the particular in the form of a 
“constitutive exception”, which is the central notion in which universality should be grounded 
(Žižek 1999:99). To achieve this, it is necessary to identify “universality with the point of 
exclusion” (Žižek 1999:224). This can be achieved in practice, for example, through the 
solidarity with the exploited and the excluded. Here, Žižek uses two different examples from the 
former East Germany, or GDR11 (Žižek 1999:189): the immigrant workers, and the Albanian and 
Bosnian Muslims (Žižek 1999:224). The minorities are in this case the particular; they fulfill the 
notion of Žižek’s ‘constitutive exception’. They are excluded from the ‘culture’ or ‘nation’ 
which is considered as a Whole. The true concrete universality that transcends both particular 
hegemonic interests and the empty abstract universality is thus achieved through the particular 
                                                          
11 Former East Germany, formally: German Democratic Republic. 
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exception, not as some particular predetermined essence, but as a political struggle. Concrete 
universal is therefore only established through particular (as difference), which becomes the 
inherent element of the universal. I understand Žižek’s particularity, or ‘exclusion,’ as a center 
and not margins of politics. 
 
This can also be applied to anthropology. For example, in anthropology of globalization and the 
human rights, human rights cannot be seen as a fixed ‘expressive’ model that has to be followed 
blindly, but as antagonistic process which should include a (‘performative’) dialogue with the 
excluded social groups. 
An important question in this regard is how exactly are these politics different or similar from the 
commonly understood politics of human rights? I consider this question in the third part of this 
essay (see below). 
There is an important difference established here between anthropological or scientific 
universalism advocated above by Geertz and political or human rights universalism, as discussed 
here in relation to Žižek’s theories. Geertz’s aim in this regard is scientific knowledge 
production: to understand the human through the perspective of the universal while Žižek, is 
more concerned with the political usefulness of the concrete universality in the reconciliation 








3. Part II 
 
In this second part of the essay, I continue with the discussion of the idea of cultural 
relativism, and its related concept of culture. In this relation, I also critically examine the terms 
such as identity politics, multiculturalism and essentialism12iii. My goal is to analyze these 
concepts from the perspective of the binary bind between cultural relativism and universalism. In 
this way, I expose the limitations of cultural relativism and at the same time reveal scholarly and 
political potentials of the universalist approach.    
In the next section, I examine how theoretical framework within which the concept of cultural 
relativism operates: particularly the notion of culture and cultural difference, approached through 
a theoretical and historical perspective. 
 
 
3.1. Culture, Difference, and the Way Cultural Relativism Idea 
has Developed 
 
The concept of cultural relativism is connected with tolerance and respect for cultural 
difference. However, before I address both of these concepts, I first examine the concept of 
culture through historical and theoretical perspective, and then relate it to cultural relativism. 
      In the enlightenment period, Comte and Spencer were accountable for establishing social 
sciences as positivistic13, since knowledge was exclusively based on the empirical and systematic 
approach to the observed dataiv. Social theories as scientific endeavors in the positivistic sense 
start to develop through “taking into account an awareness of deep cultural differences dividing 
                                                          
12 By definition, essentialism is “the practice of regarding something (as a presumed human trait) as having innate 
existence or universal validity rather than as being a social, ideological, or intellectual construct.” 
13 Positivism is by Comte understood as empirical, and scientific approach: “Doctrine associated with Comte who 
adopted the term ‘positive’ to convey six features of things: being real, useful, certain, precise, organic, relative. He 
used it of his philosophy, which insisted on applying the scientific attitude not only to the sciences but also to human 
affairs” (Proudfoot and Lacey 2010:311).  
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humanity” (Eriksen 2001:10). The result is Enlightenment era’s concept of man - an ‘animal 
seeking culture’- which provokes essentializing concepts of the culture (Geertz 1973:35).  
As related, social evolutionary perceptions, those of Sir Edward B. Tylor and Lewis Henry 
Morgan above all, dominated early anthropology. Their ideas are exemplified in their books 
Primitive Culture (Tylor 1871) and Ancient Society (Morgan 1877). For a long time, in the 
history of anthropology, scholars viewed ‘cultures’ as unified and isolated wholes. Sir Edward B. 
Taylor, provided his famous definition of culture as “that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by 
man as a member of society” (Tylor 1871)v.  
To this equation, Morgan added the idea of cultural evolutionism –through which he suggested 
that all cultures continuously develop from simple to complex social and cultural forms. Morgan 
assumed that human society had evolved through a series of stages, which he called savagery, 
barbarism, and civilization (Kottak 2011:294).  
Consequence of these theories reflects an emphasis in which Europe is seen as the most civilized, 
and all the other cultures as being lower on the hierarchical ladder of ‘evolution’. This theory 
goes side by side with unilinear evolution, the view that all cultures will always develop 
alongside the same patterns that take place along the same line everywhere in the world. 
However, what these scholars missed out, was differences and contradictions that exist within 
these ‘wholes’, and at the same time, the connections and mutual influences that exist between 
cultures. 
Cultural relativism develops later with Boas and others as a direct opposition to the idea of 
culture as understood by social evolutionists. Cultural relativists reacted in this way to the racism 
and chauvinism implied in social evolutionism.  
Franz Boas, an American scholar with European heritage, was at the forefront of this new 
development. Boas’ central idea, which effectively opposed evolutionism, chauvinism, and 
biological and racial determinism, being very strong at the time, was historical particularism. 
Boas claimed in this regard that particular persons and cultures exhibit distinctive cultural 
characteristics and habits which should be assessed in their own right. Boas’ argues that 
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individual cultures have to be studied in relation to their own histories, and not as points on the 
evolutionary ladder (Kottak 2011:296). For evolutionists, each culture was seen as a stage in 
evolution, while Boas considered culture as relatively independent entity. On the basis of Boas’ 
arguments, ‘culture’ becomes central concept in anthropology, with which it displaces earlier 
focus on race, seen through evolutionist perspective: “the behavior of an individual is therefore 
determined not by his racial affiliation, but by the character of his ancestry and his cultural 
environment” (Boas 1945:27). Moreover, culture becomes the main factor which shapes social 
life and helps explain the differences between the people (Kottak 2011:296). Boas’ new way of 
looking at culture led to a new approach of studying human diversity, namely, cultural 
relativism.  
Meanwhile in Europe, more precisely in France and Britain, anthropologists form a new school 
of anthropology: structural anthropology (Eriksen 2001:19). Structuralism’s most prominent 
scholar, Claude Levi-Strauss starts viewing culture as a system, constituted through structural 
relations among its elements. According to his theories, universal patterns existing within 
cultural systems are the products of the unchanging structure of the human mind. Hence, 
universal structures exist within all cultures (Kottak 2011:302). Unlike historical particularism, 
the school of structural anthropology was leaning more toward universalism than relativism. 
They also viewed systems as static wholes. 
Closer to the Boasian legacy of particularism and relativism are symbolism and interpretive 
anthropology which develop in the second part of 20th century. Symbolism is a branch of 
anthropology created in reaction to structuralism. The most simple definition of this school can 
be stated as “the study of symbols in their social and cultural context” (Kottak 2011:302).  The 
main critique in this regard was that structuralists focus on ‘structure’ and patterns whereas 
symbolists search for meanings. Structuralists focus on cross cultural comparison and universal 
interpretation, while symbolist find interest in particular cultures – they move from studying 
general laws, to the examination of human experience (Abu-Lughod 1991:474). Furthermore, 
structuralists see actions as separate form actors, while the symbolic anthropologists consider 
actions as governed by specific actor (Geertz 1973:14). In other words, symbolists refocus from 
system to individuals. Following Max Webber, Clifford Geertz popularized the concept of 
interpretative sciences. He rejects structuralism in the following terms: “[analysis of culture] is 
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not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning” 
(Geertz 1973:14). 
Another reason for the rejection of previous theories by symbolic and interpretive anthropology 
resulted from methodological differences. The participant-observation method becomes the 
central anthropological method, which focuses on particular cultures. Participant–observation is 
a field method that contributes to a more sensitive cultural relativist and particularistic approach. 
It enables the researcher to experience cultures first-hand, from close, through direct observation. 
 
 
3.1.1. Culture and Difference 
 
Building on this historical background, and using Abu-Lughod’s commentary, I analyze how 
cultural relativism operates within the notions of culture and difference. 
 
One of the most prominent commentaries on the topic is Lila Abu-Lughod’s Writing against 
Culture (1991)14. Abu-Lughod makes three main arguments in her critique of ‘cultural 
feminists’15 and ‘reverse-Orientalists’16 seen as actors essentializing culture and their identity: 
Her first argument lies in the fact that they “overlook the connections between those on each side 
of the divide, and the ways in which they define each other” (Abu-Lughod 1991:471). By doing 
so, Abu-Lughod argues, they re-assert essentialism first pointed against them by the dominant 
society. This is exemplified in man/woman, or in Occident/Orient dichotomy. 
                                                          
14 In the title Writingagainst Culture (1991) Abu-Lughod is reacting tothe title of an influential anthropological book 
at the time Writing Culture (Marcel and Clifford 1986). 
15  In her texts, Abu-Lughod mentions some cultural feminists she is criticizing: Gilligan (1982), Belenkyet (1986), 
Chodorow (1978), Hartsock (1985), and Ruddick (1980) and others (Abu-Lughod 1991:471). 
16 Abu-Lughod defines ‘reverse-Orientalism’ as an act of re-valorization of the attributes which were devaluated by 
the dominant system in their attitudes toward Oriental ‘others’. Author gives an example of a greater emphasis in 




Second argument refers to internal cultural difference: “They overlook differences within each 
category constructed by the dividing practices, differences like those of class, race, and sexuality 
… but also ethnic origin, personal experience, age, mode of livelihood, health, living situation 
(rural or urban), and historical experience”(Abu-Lughod 1991:471). Author argues that they 
“over-emphasize coherence” (Abu-Lughod 1991:471), and ignore the differences within the 
group.  
In her third argument, Abu-Lughod says that “they ignore the ways in which experiences have 
been constructed historically and have changed over time. Both cultural feminism and revivalist 
movements tend to rely on notions of authenticity and the return to positive values not 
represented by the dominant other” (Abu-Lughod 1991:471). Author criticizes the ignorance of 
the historical construction of culture and its development over time, and marks their re-
valorization of authenticity. 
What is prominent in Abu-Lughod’s discussion of culture and difference is also her critique of 
the essentializing approach to culture, both on the side of scholars and observers (from the etic 
perspective), and on the side of insiders themselves (from the emic perspective). Abu-Lughod 
examines the seemingly contradictory notion of self-essentializing discourses that exist within 
cultural feminism and in India. Despite their anti-essentialist intent, instead to counter the 
‘othering’ effect, they strengthen it by valorization of the modes of differences (Abu-Lughod 
1991:470,471). 
Her main point in this regard is that both of them view and represent ‘culture’ as something fixed 
and ‘essential’. Abu-Lughod, however, also recognizes that this kind of ‘cultural feminism,’ and 
‘reverse- Orientalism’, can be useful political tools for these communities “in forging a sense of 
unity and in waging struggles of empowerment” (Abu-Lughod 1991:471). 
Furthermore, this kind of essentialist approach to culture also creates and reinforces the 
boundaries between cultures, overlooks their connections, and creates hierarchies between them. 
She points out the following: “I will argue that ‘culture’ operates in anthropological discourse to 
enforce separations that inevitably carry a sense of hierarchy” (Abu-Lughod, 1991:466) 
One of the main reasons for this essentialist concept of culture comes from the pioneering 
anthropologists who were working under the banner of imperialism. The dichotomy in question 
is a historically constructed product of colonialism, when the West needed to construct non-
Western people and cultures as inferior ‘others,’ in order to justify their exploitation (cf. Said 
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1978, Abu-Lughod 1991:470,472). A consequence of evolutionary perceptions that projected the 
Orient as ‘barbaric’ and ‘non-civilized’ resulted consequently in  Europeans being able to 
perceive themselves in contrast as ‘civilized’. This is why Abu-Lughod named her essay 
metaphorically Writing against Culture, calling us to challenge this essentialized and harmful 
notion of ‘culture’ as something fixed and essentially different.  
 
Abu-Lughod also offers measures to counter this problem; she promotes the writing of 
“ethnographies of the particular” with the goal of countering potential “othering” effect of the 
concept of culture among anthropologists (Abu-Lughod 1991:473). In her view, ethnographies of 
the particular are the most suitable in presenting the contradictions and complexities of cultures 
as they are enacted on a daily basis. Thus, “writing against culture” is writing against a common 
way of presenting and analyzing culture as something static, homogenous, and independent. 
 
 
3.2. Cultural Relativism’s Political and Intellectual Descendants 
 
 
I discuss here two of the cultural relativism’s ‘intellectual descendants’17: identity politics and 
multiculturalism. I consider these concepts because they offer practical examples to present the 
abstract and general relationship between universalism and cultural relativism. I also explain, 
through the lenses of cultural relativism, the main dilemmas related to these terms.  
Unlike the previous part of the text, where I write about the theoretical schools and scholarly 
debates about relativism and universalism, I change the focus here to the question of the 
relationship between national and international political systems and between individuals and 
group. Therefore, the role of identity is going to take a significant part in the discussion.  
 
                                                          
17According to Dr. Edward Younkins: “multiculturalism, racism, postmodernism, deconstructionism, political 
correctness, and social engineering are among cultural relativism’s ‘intellectual descendants’” (Younkins 2000). 
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Furthermore, I present identity politics from the ‘inside’ perspective, or how minority groups 
relate to the state and society, while multiculturalism, seen from the ‘outside’ perspective, tells a 
story about how the state deals from ‘outside’ with minority groups and with cultural diversity 
existing within a society. Before that, I briefly discuss the concept of ‘essentialism’, which is 
integral part of both identity politics and multiculturalism.  
 
 In essentialism any specific entity is considered as having a fixed set of attributes that determine 
its identity and function which represents its so-called true nature. The concept of essentialism is 
constitutive part of totalizing ideologies such as nationalism, Nazism, racism, and biological 
determinism, to mention a few. Closely related to essentialism are reification and literalism as 
forms and variations of reductionism (Barnard and Spencer 1996:188). Essentialists reduce 
identities and social phenomena to most general and basic forms, which results in stereotyping. 
Seemingly, essentialism opposes relativism, but is actually often also its constitutive part. 
According to Kottak, “essentialism describes the process of viewing an identity as established, 
real, and frozen, to hide the historical processes and politics within which that identity 
developed” (Kottak 2011:593).  
Another characteristic of essentialism is that - in the making of identities – through it, things are 
taken as a priori, or ‘God given’. In this way, they do not take into account historical 
contingency. Thus, one of the problems with essentialism is its negation of the change in people 
or society. 
I present this in Geertz’s opinion on essentialism, as discussed by Barnard and Spencer (1996): 
“In Geertz’s (…) influential study of nationalism, for example essentialism appears in tandem 
with ‘epochalism’ as a defining characteristic of nationalism, and especially as the conflationary 
notion of ‘national character’ grounded in such shared symbolic substances as blood. In this 
sense, epochalism – a modernist Zeitgeist – is temporarily the antithesis but also the corollary of 
essentialism, which requires the construction of a set of age-old national traditions through which 
national origins are effectively placed beyond real time altogether” (1996:189). Here, Geertz 
confirms aforementioned a priori feature of essentialism: he emphasizes an importance of 
essentialist position in relation to ideology of nationalism. In this sense, factors which 
characterizes nationalism the most is a suppression of the particular (i.e., minorities, or the local).   
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3.2.1. Identity Politics 
 
In continuation, I examine the relationship between relativism and universalism from the 
political perspective. I discuss the notion of identity politics and its paradox as related to the 
essentialised notions that these kinds of politics produce. This paradox is an outcome of the use 
of essentialized notion of identity as a basis for the political struggle of particular social groups, 
usually the minorities, or the dominated social groups. 
 
George Herber Mead states that: “The self is something which has a development; it is not 
initially there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and activity, that is, develops 
in the given individual as a result of his relations to that process as a whole and to other 
individuals within that process” (Eriksen 2001:40). We are social and cultural beings, nurtured 
trough enculturation - the process of acquiring one’s culture. Our identities are fluid and multiple 
(Kottak 2011:593). We usually identify ourselves through our sex or sexual preference, ethnicity, 
nation, region, religion, etc.  
The ‘identity politics’ is yet another overloaded term that I explain in this text. Identity politics 
represent theory and political practice that stems from the experience of injustice or exclusion, 
marginalization, or segregation, shared among the members of a certain social groupvi. Thomas 
Hylland Eriksen describes identity politics as a glocal phenomenon, i.e., as the blend of global 
and local (Eriksen 2001:291). Identity politics are politics usually conducted from within the 
culture or society. The identity politics’ goal is to enable political freedom of a specific 
constituency, usually a minority group, marginalized within its larger context – usually the 
statevii. In other words, identity politics are “confined to a territory and a particular in-group, yet 
they depend on a global discourse about culture and rights in order to succeed” (Eriksen 
2001:291).  
A tricky part is that identity politics, despite their seemingly anti-essentialist intent, often use 
essentialists strategies. For example, sometimes marginalized minority group reasserts same 
logic of essentialism used previously by majority group to dominate them. They use it in their 
struggle for self-determination, asserting their particular socio-political or cultural rights. This is 
similar to what Lila Abu-Lughod was saying in her Writing Against Culture. Her point was that 
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some notion of fixed identity, as it is used in a political context, is created in opposition, or 
negative relation, to some other group. Minorities (and the colonized social groups) often use 
fixed notions of identity in this regard, as reclaimed and appropriated from the dominant society. 
Abu-Lughod provides an example of “Gandhian appeal to the greater spirituality of a Hindu 
India, compared with the materialism and violence of the West” (Abu-Lughod 1991:470). She 
calls these phenomena ‘reverse essentialism’ and self-Orientalization in the context of Orientalist 
discourse (Abu-Lughod 1991:470). This kind of tactic is also named “strategic essentialism” by 
Gayatry Chakravory Spivakviii. 
For a better understanding of identity politics, and its possible political consequences, the case of 
former Yugoslavia is illustrative:  
 “In the former republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) you can be 
everything but – Yugoslavian”ix. Today, everybody in the former Yugoslavian republics gets 
stigmatized by his or her nationality and religion. Yugoslavism through ‘brotherhood and unity’ 
represented the idea which exceeds nationalism, and combats its essentialist logic. Yugoslavian 
project endeavored to transcend particularistic politics through some kind of ‘universalism’ 
(federalism).  A useful example of the risks of identity politics can be seen in the dynamic that 
led to the dismembering of the socialist Yugoslav federation in 1991. During the previous years, 
through mechanisms established by the 1974 Constitution and via the decentralized structure of 
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, political elites in the country behaved as the 
representatives of republics which to a certain extent were supposed to represent national 
groups18. The particular case of a very multicultural Bosnia and Herzegovina, in general 
republican autonomy in terms of culture, education and economic administration, was part of a 
greater frame of regulation of national conflict, in which identity politics (in the form of ethnic 
exclusivism) were perceived by the Yugoslav government as a main threat to Yugoslavian state 
and its project of ‘brotherhood and unity.’ Some of the major conflicts of the time, such as the 
highway conflict with Slovenia in 1969, and the mass populist movement that came to be known 
as the Croatian Spring in the early 1970s, can be thus interpreted as a result of this structure of 
                                                          
18Kottak refers to national group/nationality: “Ethnic groups that once had, or wish to have or regain, autonomous 
political status (their own country) are called nationalities” (Kottak 2011:347). 
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political and national representation in which Yugoslavism, as an all-encompassing identity, 
became weaker and weaker.  
However, it would only be in the 1980s, after the death of Josip Broz Tito, and in the midst of a 
generalized financial and economic crisis that the identity politics exploded, unleashing a 
spiraling dynamic of national tensions, especially between the republics of Slovenia and Serbia, 
where political elites developed strong links with nationalist movements in order to reinforce 
their bargaining position at the federal level. By the end of the 1980s, Slovenian, Serbian and 
Croatian19 national elites had concluded that the political agreement represented by the last 
Yugoslav Constitution was leading nowhere and that Yugoslavia as a federation was no longer 
viable. Hence, in the context of global and regional transformation of the early 1990s, 
nationalistic identity politics would go from being a mere mechanism of political and economic 
regulation in a multinational state to becoming a foundation of new Southeastern European 
national states that came out of the dissolution of Yugoslavia (Cohen 1995, Eriksen 2001).  
From the last two centuries, we have learned hard lessons on nationalism, and, in the twenty first 
century, we are supposed to learn from our mistakes: that actions based on essentialism and 
identity politics rarely lead to a more just and free world. In reaction to the essentialism of 
identity politics, some authors advocate for anti-essentialist approaches: “If the modern ‘problem 
of identity’ is how to construct an identity and keep it solid and stable, the postmodern ‘problem 
of identity’ is primarily to avoid fixation and keep the options open” (cf. Bauman, in Eriksen 
2001:143); however, there also exist valid critiques of anti-essentialism, and suggestions for anti-
anti essentialist approach, for example, in Gilroy 1993). We need to consider culture vis-à-vis 
cultural identities as fluid and porous, for the sake of avoiding political and moral errors we have 
made in the past.  
I presented here how identity politics worked in the context of former Yugoslavia. I conclude in 
somewhat radical manner that these politics can lead to war and genocide. On the other hand, I 
find it important to recognize and remind that identity politics, beside their limitations (use of 
essentialist notions and exclusivism), can also often be seen as useful tools for minority groups in 
their struggles for their political rights and for their cultural empowerment.  
                                                          





Similar to my discussion of identity politics, which I understand as a political aspect of cultural 
relativism and universalism, is also an ambiguous notion of multiculturalism, which I also regard 
as one of the practical political applications of cultural relativism. 
After the World War II, with the advancement of intense globalization, globalization of 
capitalism, modern state, technology, communication and accessibility to information, 
anthropologists stared explaining ‘cultures’ as linked, intertwined and changing. In the third 
millennium, prospects for ethnicity and uniform cultures are uncertain, but we are also 
witnessing growing importance of the cultural identities. On one side, homogenizing factor of 
nationalism does not allow enough space for those ‘smaller’ cultural/ethnic identities.20 While on 
the other side, highly industrialized, multiethnic states must forge purely civic (i.e. non-
ethnically based) national identities, if they are to be called true democracies (cf. Hayden 1996). 
 
In the midst of the today’s convulsed state of political affairs in the world, multicultural view is 
the one which opposes essentialist, assimilationist and exclusivist models of the nation – 
nationalism and racism.21  
 
The multiculturalists’ main idea is that of tolerance and equal values among all cultures together 
with the belief that there are no general truths, norms or values pertaining to some ‘universal’ 
standard. As we saw in the beginning of this essay, cultural relativists share the same ideas of 
tolerance, egalitarian view of cultures, and opposition to universality. It can be said that 
multiculturalism is a political version of the cultural relativism applied by the state and the 
general society. In continuation, I question character of multiculturalism. Does it represent a 
universalist approach to cultural relativism? Or is it particularistic? Or it is some combination of 
the two? 
 
                                                          
20 Nationalism not, but capitalism is particularly flexible to incorporate cultural difference.  
21 In Kottak’s book racism is “the belief that a perceived racial difference is a sufficient reason to value one person 
less than another” (Kotakk 2011:357). 
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Surprisingly, anthropologists are reluctant when it comes to a discussion about multiculturalism. 
One of the reasons is that multiculturalists often use 19th century concept of culture as their 
starting point, which is rejected by most anthropologists today. 
 
Unfortunately, multicultural approach bears certain shortcomings, and I present them through 
two authors whose ideologies stand on the opposite poles in the political spectrum. One of them 
is Slavoj Žižek, who I have already mentioned in this essay, and the other is free market oriented 
Dr. Edward W. Younkins.  
 
In his article “Why the World is the Way It Is: Cultural Relativism and Its Descendents” 
(Younkins 2000) Younkins points out that, beside the tolerant spirit of multiculturalism towards 
cultural diversity, there is one worldview which multiculturalists have excluded from equal 
values among all cultures, namely Eurocentric Western view. His main claim is that 
multiculturalists discharge importance of the Western perspective because it bears traditions of 
elitism, sexism and racism based on privileges of the dead white males (Younkins 2000). Author 
blames multiculturalists for double standards in this regard. 
Younkins also adds that multiculturalists imply that the notion of multiple ‘cultures’22 holds a 
strong influence on our way of thinking and seeing the world around us, and on our beliefs that 
teach person is a representative of his or her ‘culture’. Every group has its own standard of right 
and wrong. And “it is therefore impossible to discuss, argue, or judge any one group’s truth as 
better” (Younkins 2000). As a result, he or she is bound to be in compliance with its own 
‘culture’ in order to escape exclusion from it. Younkins argues: “Multiculturalism thus destroys 
an individual’s confidence in his own mind—this occurs when a person allows his group to tell 
him what to believe” (Younkins 2000).23  
This objection is valid, only if the very idea of multiculturalism is based on the concept of 
culture from the 19th century I have discussed before – culture viewed as fixed, isolated, and 
                                                          
22 Race, ethnicity, and sex or sexual preference in this context.  
23Younkins adds that “for the multiculturalist, truth only exists by consensus within each biologically defined group” 
(Younkins 2000). Author takes for granted here that the notion of culture (either as race, ethnicity, or sexual 




homogeneous entity. Out of this, Younkins concludes that multiculturalism is anti-individualistic 
concept as it limits individual’s options to those held by his or her cultural group. In his 
essentialist view, multiculturalists tend to have this binary perspective that an individual’s 
worldview or ‘culture’ is either a construct of his or her identity group, or he or she is an outsider 
spoiled by the Western logic: “multiculturalists assign each rational and autonomous individual 
into a group based on the group’s specific, absolute, and nondebatable dissemblances from other 
groups” (Younkins 2000).  
 
About the multiculturalism, which evokes the ideas such as tolerance and peaceful coexistence 
among most of people, Younkins makes forcible arguments, accusing multiculturalists for being 
anti-Western, anti-individualist or collectivist, and essentialising. As such, multiculturalists want 
to change culturally assimilated societies (i.e. The United States of America) to unassimilated 
(multicultural societies).  
Based on these claims, he finishes his argument with saying that “multiculturalists fail to see that 
the diversity methods they use to find and create diversity will, in fact, divide the country24. The 
result will be a widespread, societal tendency toward hatred, revenge, or belief in the innate 
superiority of one’s group and a feeling of solidarity and self-righteousness” (Younkins 2000).   
 
Slavoj Žižek talks about multiculturalism in several of his books, but his most basic insights 
about the topic are succinctly presented in his interview about one of his latest books, called On 
Violence (2008)x. In this interview, Žižek is critical of liberal multiculturalists, and their 
assumptions. Žižek argues that it is not enough to say that we live in different ‘cultures’25 and 
that we need some neutral (universal) legal space to regulate how we should tolerate each other, 
because simply, it does not work that way. 
He gives the example of Martin Luther King, saying that he was not fighting for the ‘tolerance’ 
toward of African-American people, but for their legal and economic rights. A problem is that 
                                                          
24Younkins is speaking about the United States of America here. 
25 Because I am still talking about the multiculturalism, term 'culture' is rather defined by biological character, 
meaning that it represents ethnicities, races, sexes, sexual preferences etc.  
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we live in a post-political26 society (Žižek 1999:198), where all the conflicts are politically 
neutralized; conflicts are no longer presumed as political or economic, but restated as cultural. 
Žižek adds that, in this case, if conflicts have become cultural, all we can do is to ‘tolerate’.  
Moreover, Žižek argues against the multiculturalists’ motto which states that one has to 
understand the ‘other’ in order to have an open discussion. Žižek raises a question on how 
different ‘cultures’, for example Arabs, Indians and Latinos, who live in the same ‘block’, can be 
decent and respectful to each other without this multiculturalists ‘all-encompassing 
understanding’ of each other? In his view, it is not up to these individuals to get along, but up to 
the state and other authorities and institutions to solve the problem structurally, through laws and 
regulations. 
The point is that ‘tolerance’ and ‘understanding’ are insufficient to solve the problems of racism, 
sexism, and economic inequality. Žižek offers the way to counter these problems by focusing on 
solving material or structural inequality, and the power differentials that emerge from itxi. From 
this perspective, if we want to deal with such global issues, we need to develop some kind of 
universal language and approach. In order to achieve this universalism, we need to follow the 
guidelines outlined in the discussion about ‘true’ concrete universality. The point is that one or 
more abstract ‘universal’ legal codes will lead us nowhere, but if we consider ‘performative’ 
never-ending reconciliation of particular political struggles within the universal sphere, Žižek 
believes these problems can be solved to some extent. Moreover, for Žižek, multiculturalism 
serve as an excuse to emphasize problems of secondary nature, while displacing the real problem 







                                                          
26 Term ‘post-politics’ stands for state of affairs where political values are replaced by moral ones.  
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4. Part III. Human Rights 
 
 
        In the next chapter, I examine the conceptual framework within which the notion of 
universalism operates. I focus on the dialectic relationship between human rights on one side, 
and cultural relativism on the other, as approached from a theoretical perspective, while 
considering also its practical applications. Furthermore, I analyze some of the problems of the 
human rights concept in relation to culture, as it is understood by the representatives of 
multiculturalism, and critiqued by cultural relativists. 
 
 
4.1. Vicissitudes of Human Rights 
 
Human rights are the “rights based on justice and morality beyond and superior to particular 
countries, cultures, and religions” (Kottak 2011:39). Human rights pertain to individual rights, 
while they are globally applicable. In addition, human rights relate to every human being 
equally, regardless of time and space, or history and culture, and. because of that, they are 
‘universal’.  
Almost all of the internationally recognized human rights are included in the United Nations’ 
documents: the United Nations Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (Kottak 2011:39).  
Besides human rights, there are also cultural rights – the “rights vested in religious and ethnic 
minorities and indigenous societies” (Kottak 2011:39); and, last but not least, there exist 
intellectual property rights – the rights of “an indigenous group’s collective knowledge and its 
applications” (Kottak 2011:39). There are lots of criticisms and philosophical debates about the 
universality of human rights, especially when it comes to a decision on what to do when cultural 
(i.e., group) rights do not comply with human (i.e., individual) rights (Kottak 2011:42). The 
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scope of the discussion on this topic is too broad to be covered in this essay, and, because of this, 
I am discussing only ‘individual’ human rights. 
     Nowadays, we can certainly claim that there is no imaginable topic in terms of the concept of 
human rights that would not turn out at first as problematic. Even the genealogy of the idea of 
human rights by itself supports this hypothesis. The origin of the concept is a problem in itself27: 
whether it primarily belongs to moral, ethical, legal or political category. 
Human rights discourse is both uncritically adopted and harshly criticized by a variety of 
political, civic and social actors, be it left, right or center. On one side there are human rights 
activists who support universalism and see culture as homogenous and unchanging, and as such 
an obstacle to achieving these rights for everyone (Merry 2003:43).  On the other side, there are 
anthropologists who argue that culture does not present and obstacle to universal human rights, 
because it is ever-changing and as such can and should be an important part when considering 
human rights (Barnard and Spencer 2010:483). This poses a problem in abridging the issues 
regarding the relation universal human rights vs. culture, and thus the inability to improve and 
apply human rights measures, as well as the quality of life worldwide.      
I do not believe that this problem is without a solution that can satisfy all sides of the spectrum. 
However, this very antagonism between relativism and universalism can lead to results in the 
emancipating potential for the human rights discourse.  
To analyze this topic, I am examining the articles written by two contemporary anthropologists: 
Sally Engle Merry and Kirsten Hastrup, both distinguished scholars in human rights discourse. 
Marry notes that the problem is in the misunderstanding of the concept of culture by human 
activists and journalists which leads to cultural relativism’s image as an obstacle towards human 
rights. Hastrup discusses the inability of the legal language to capture the ‘real’ human 
experience, and thus to offer an adequate form of justice together with its compensation for the 
victims.  
                                                          
27 The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was coined by the victors of the Second World War in 1948, and 
thus it “expressed a particularly Euro-American vision of what it meant to be human” (Barnard and Spencer 
2010:361).  Furthermore, the American Anthropological Association warned about its disregard toward the “cultural 
particularities” (Barnard and Spencer 2010:361). 
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4.1.1. The Common Misunderstandings of the Concept of ‘Culture’ and Its 
Consequences for Human Rights 
 
          At the onset, it is important to state that universal human rights activists and relativists are 
not philosophically or morally opposed to each other. The dialogue between them is quite 
notable, but, again, the idea of cultural relativism is anathema to many human rights activists. 
One of the reasons is that cultural relativists (as it has been repeatedly said in this essay) treat all 
cultural perspectives as equally valuable. They argue for tolerance of practices from different 
cultures, which sometimes stand at odds with the human rights as depicted in the original UN 
charter. Moreover, the relativistic caution that human rights are rooted in the Western civilization 
and that even though they are commonly accepted in Europe or North America does not mean 
that they are standards in some other parts of the world. However, the biggest disagreement 
between human rights activist and anthropologist is the very concept and definition of culture. 
While the first see culture as a whole, subject to generalizations and unchanging, meaning that 
they have an essentialist view of the culture, while the latter see it as a dynamic and ever-
changing. 
     In her text Human Rights Law and the Demonization of Culture (2003) Sally Engle Merry 
writes about common misconceptions that human rights activists, lawyers and journalist have 
about anthropologists and their involvement with human rights issues regarding the incident that 
happened in Pakistan at the time.  
Namely, there was a gang-rape of a young Pakistani girl which was authorized by the local tribal 
council (Merry 2003:42).  A journalist contacted Merry, presuming that her allegiances stand 
with morally defined cultural relativists. In this case, the journalist in question was expecting that 
Merry will defend local practices of the Pakistani tribe council. Instead, Merry condemned the 
act, saying that it does not represent the Pakistani society, that it has more to do with local 
political and class struggles (Merry 2003:43). Merry draws a parallel with United States for a 
better understanding, where a particular wrongdoing, such as a company tax fraud, should not be 
regarded as a representation of a homogeneous United States ‘culture.’ 
The resulting frustration for the journalist, except for the obvious fact that Merry did not condone 
rape in any form, was journalist’s misinterpretation of culture as a homogenous entity, and not a 
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heterogeneous social constellation that allows for differences, especially in a country and a 
culture as big and complicated as Pakistan. This explains that the journalist, as well as many 
other human right activists and even some anthropologists28, have a misconception that 
anthropologists and cultural relativists reject the idea of having their own political and moral 
judgments. Merry argues that there is a fundamental misinterpretation of cultural relativism, 
where human rights lawyers, journalists and activist misinterpret the concept of culture itself. 
They fail to see that in the 21st century, most anthropologists reject the 19th century concept of 
culture, but regard ‘culture’ in a more anti-essentialist, dynamic, and hybrid way (Merry 
2003:43).  Consequently, cultural relativism appears misguided if such a concept of ‘culture’ is 
used when journalists or scholars address harmful practices from around the globe. 
The second issue that Merry addresses in her article is the relationship between cultural 
relativism and human rights. The misunderstood concept of culture is again the main obstacle in 
this debate: “Where this conception [of culture] widely recognized within popular culture as well 
as among journalists and human-rights activists, it could shift the terms of the intractable debate 
between universalism and relativism. Instead, culture is increasingly understood as a barrier to 
the realization of human rights by activists and a tool for legitimizing noncompliance with 
human rights by conservatives” (Merry 2003:43). From this it follows that if the concept of 
culture would be properly understood: cultural relativism would not have to stand at odds with 
human rights.   
Moreover, because of the misconception surrounding the concept of culture, anthropology is 
often ignored and seen as irrelevant by human rights activists, even when it could actually be 
beneficial in finding proper human rights solutions (Merry 2003:44). In Merry’s view, 
anthropology itself should be central in these kinds of debates: “Adopting a more sophisticated 
and dynamic understanding of culture not only promotes human–rights activism, but also 
relocates anthropological theorizing to the center of these issues rather than to the margins, 
where it has been banished” (Merry 2003:44). One thing favoring the anthropology is that it is 
changing quite rapidly toward acceptance of human rights in a form that respects the cultural 
differences. To see this we need to mention the problem of 1947 AAA statement which was 
condemned by a law professor as “tolerance without limits” (Merry 2003:42) which paints moral 
                                                          
28 S. A. Merry gives the example of Karen Engle (2001) 
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cultural relativism as something anthropologist should be ashamed of. Current anthropology is 
arguably more advanced, but what is missing the most, as Merry notes in the quote above, is 
political engagement by anthropologists, which should be central for the discipline. Because of 
this lack of political activism, the public sees anthropologists as enablers of harmful practices, 
and not as protectors of human rights within particular cultures.  
One of the most frequent examples of harmful practices used to depict the dilemma posed by 
cultural relativists is female genital mutilation (henceforth, FGM), which I have mentioned in the 
beginning of this essay. Female genital mutilation represents ‘traditional’ practices in some parts 
of Africa and the Middle East. These practices include Clitoridectomy (removal of the clitoris) 
and Infibulation (sewing of the vaginal lips – labia) (Kottak 2011:39).  
When it comes to FGM, the issue at hand is that, on one side, human rights activists use a 
holistic (mis)understanding of culture: “Culture equals tradition and is juxtaposed to women’s 
human rights to equality” (Marry 2003:43). On the other side, national elites of the countries 
where FGM is still practiced defend it in the name of culture and tradition in order to pursue their 
own political interests. However, both sides see the culture in the same essentialist manner, the 
only difference is that the Westerners often use it in a way that reveals their remaining colonial 
attitudes, and the latter to express their anti-colonial ones. This conflict creates a cross-cultural 
deadlock.  This way of thinking only deepens the notion of cultural relativism as something 
negative, as an obstacle towards achieving human rights. 
The essentialist notion of culture creates disdain for cultural relativism and a general loss 
of ‘tolerance of difference’: “As human-rights law demonizes culture, it misunderstands 
anthropology as well. The holistic conception of culture provides no space for change, 
contestation or the analysis of the links between the power, practice and values. Instead it 
becomes barrier to the reformist project of universal human rights. From the legal perspective of 
human rights, it is the texts, the documents and compliance that matter. Universalism is essential 
while relativism is bad. There is a sense of moral certainty which taking account of culture 
disrupts. This means, however, that normal principle of tolerance for difference is lost” (Merry 
2003:43). The question that comes to mind is straightforward: how to reconcile cultural 
differences and universalism in relation to this case? On the one hand we should definitely 
prevent demonization of entire countries that condone FGM, which only leads to further 
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deepening of racism and colonialist attitudes from the West. On the other hand we should 
recognize, magnify and enable the voices of the people from these same countries that struggle 
within local communities in the effort to end such harmful practices and pursue the human rights 
discourse. However it should be done without a twinge of colonialist imposition of the Western 
values from afar which means little to the people involved in struggles against FGM. 
Cultural relativism as understood by anthropologists, and universalism as seen by human 
rights activists are only opposed to each other if we view them through the lens of essentialist 
concept of culture. The conclusion is that they can work hand in hand if we understand the 
concept of culture properly. This can be possible only through conversation and political 
activism, as well as if both sides take some responsibility and get involved with each other in 
order to overcome these problems.  
 
 
4.1.2. Instrumentalization of the language 
 
       One point which can be found in Merry’s text that I have not discussed above is the 
instrumentalization of the language and law in human rights discourse. Where anthropology is 
descriptive and supposedly non-instrumental, human rights are the exact opposite of that.  They 
are represented by the law, which has a concrete and instrumental function in this regard. 
Especially looking from a political perspective, the law is a tool that provides legal knowledge 
which is then used to solve human rights problems from the legal perspective. In the title of 
Merry’s article “Human Rights Law and Demonization of Culture,” she suggests that human 
rights law can negatively affect our conceptions of ‘other’ cultures. She seems to be referring 
specifically to the legal language human rights activist use and implications of that language on 
the concepts of culture. In general, in the sphere of cultural relativism, language is of great 
importance “since language is seen as a means of categorizing, and therefore constructing, 
experience, and actively shaping what counts as reality” (Barnard and Spencer 2010). This may 
be troublesome everlasting aspect for cultural relativists’ description and human rights 
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instrumentalization, in the sense that language can prove to be insufficient to sufficiently 
‘capture’ human experience.  
    Kirsten Hastrup, another prominent anthropologist in the field of human rights discusses this 
inability of legal language to capture the experience of suffering and violence, in her article 
Violence, suffering and human rights (2003).Author introduces the situation with the short, but 
poignant story about a horrific incident, which occurred in Surinam in the 1990s: 
A group of Surinam solders met twenty unarmed Maroons, and supposedly, under the suspicion 
that they are associates with guerilla ‘jungle commandos’, they beat them up heavily, cut them, 
and urinated on them. They released some of them, but they kept others in captivity (one of them 
was fifteen year old child), drove them away, made them dig their own graves, and shot them 
dead. One did not die immediately, and stayed alive, only long enough to tell this story (Hastrup 
2003:310).  
This ‘incident’ went to the court (Inter-American Court of Human Rights) against the Surinam 
state. After the trial, Surinamese government accepted the responsibility of those soldiers, and 
the case was closed.  
Consequently, the state wanted to compensate the victims and their families (Hastrup 2003:311), 
but they had a problem with exactly who should be compensated as a part of that family. 
Namely, in the victims’ village, they did not have the Western concept of a family - for them, the 
family represented more than a group of close blood relatives, and in that sense a wider social 
alliance. What the court ended up deciding, with a help of some anthropologists, is that the 
whole village should be regarded as one big family. They compensated the victims and their 
heirs with the entitlement to school fees for children, and school and medical dispensary were 
given to the community, as a compensation for the loss of the individual lives and the suffering 
of all of the involved (Hastrup 2003:311). According to Hastrup, this was a problem, since it 
“possibly continues an obsolete (if well meaning) image of the ‘Others’ that we are bound to call 
into doubt in this era of methodological individualism and (inter-) subjectivities” (Hastrup 
2003:312). What the author suggests is that Westerners once again essentialized the ‘other’ 
culture, and made it seem more homogeneous and exotic as it was in reality, while at the same 
time, they neglected the experiences of individuals and the role of difference in that society. 
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Unfortunately, this tragedy concerning Maroons in Surinam represents a common occurrence 
from all over the world.  
This act of compensation or reparation is one which interests Hastrup the most. How does one 
calculate somebody’s humiliation, suffering and life? Even more, how does one define terms 
such as suffering and violence?  
Hastrup says that in perceiving ‘violence’ and, all the more, the concept of ‘suffering,’ there 
exists a problem of representation and definition of human experience, “suffering not only 
escapes definition, it also defies objective measurement by belonging so intimately to the 
subjective domain” (Hastrup 2003:310).   
Hastrup investigates the way how to deal with these issues. One common answer to the problem 
is instrumentalization of international human rights and their laws (legal and ethical) upon which 
societies can measure their human rights record. Hastrup contemplates to what extent can this be 
helpful? And if the anthropologists can contribute to this resolving these issues? Can 
anthropology and human rights work together? 
This is a troublesome issue where Hastrup doubts anthropologists to undertake a quest to convert 
an enormous ‘bundle’ of political and moral problems and reduce it into a fixed package of legal 
logistics (Hastrup 2003:312). Such a ‘bundle’ represents all the moral and physical terrors of 
victimized Maroons, and accordingly poses a challenge of how to deal with them properly in the 
sphere of the legal language, which is alien to the Maroon society. The Maroons are in this case 
represented as the ‘Others’, who the human rights representatives do not know much about, and 
therefore they cannot sufficiently represent them. Furthermore, the reparation was decided 
according to the western law, by the western lawyers. It is not apparent in the Hastrup’s article, 
but it seems that the reparation supposedly did not take into account the plights of the victims 
and their family members. 
I already said that violence and suffering cannot be properly represented from the legal 
perspective. In my opinion it is similar as with notion of culturexii, except that suffering is 
perhaps even one step farther away from representation, because of if its ‘silence’ (Hastrup 
2003:309). Hastrup advocates for these kinds of ‘disorders’ (i.e., suffering, violence, which are 
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usually regarded as ‘exceptions’ to the ‘order’ of culture) should be included into the concept of 
‘culture’. 
The biggest inconsistency which characterizes the process of representing local culture and its 
implicit morality through foreign international law and its explicit universalized norms is in a 
somewhat forced appropriation of a particular culture by the law. Here, we stumble once again 
against the paradox of identity politics, as Hastrup argues: “by investing groups of people with 
particular collective rights, culture itself is (re-)essentialized, and the legitimate language for 
political struggle is twisted” (Hastrup 2003:317). Human rights are laws, and the law is power, 
represented through language, which means that “objectifying features of the language turn into 
fundamentalist notions of right and wrong” (Hastrup 2003:317). In other words, the law fixes 
and predetermines justice, and at the same time establishes binary notion of ‘winners and losers’ 
where there is complexity and contradiction (Hastrup 2003:317). 
This represents a problem of instrumentalization, or institutionalization of particular (case of 
Surinam Maroons) in the sphere of the universal (human rights). Is it possible to make the real 
universal standard to which every human being can compare her or his actions while avoiding 
any type of ‘imperialism’? 
From the texts I have analyzed, the answer to the question is that it is improbable, but not 
impossible. The constant effort, and in the case of the human rights discourse, even greater 
involvement of the anthropologists vis-à-vis cultural relativists into the discussion and generation 
of the human rights might eventually lead us to better solutions.  Not the final, static solution, but 
a better, more dynamic one. But the real answer to the question is greater inclusion of the ‘local 
voices’ to the debate: “Practicing toleration is to engage in conversation with those who are 
different, rather than to suppress their voice or avoid them altogether” (Hastrup 2003:315). 
Hastrup talks about ‘dialogue’ where Žižek talks about ‘struggle’, but both agree on “identifying 
universality with the point of exclusion” (Žižek 1999:224), where in Hastrup’s commentary, 
‘local voices’ stand for point of exclusion.  
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Discussing the universality of human rights in terms of conflicting roles between universalism 
and relativism,29 Hastrup makes a point that human rights have to be universal in at least some 
sense, because if they are not applicable to all humans, the whole idea of human rights is 
pointless (Hastrup 2001).  
This makes us think about the problem of the universal versus relative, and the ways to reconcile 
one with another. Each particular culture, as well as subjective feelings of suffering, ordeal and 
violence, is almost impossible to incorporate into an objective and universal discourse. Human 
rights should not be regarded as abstract universal, but as ‘true’ concrete universal. Human rights 
should not be fixed and predominated by neither the language nor the law; instead, they can only 
‘performatevely’ emerge through the dialogue. We should demand acknowledgement of the 
cultural and subjective complexity and difference in its solutions. Moreover, we should 
acknowledge the ‘split/gap’ that will always exist in this regard, and try not to pretend that 
institutions and courts have the implicit power to resolve these issues.  
The task of instrumentalization is additionally aggravated by the global system in which we live, 
because of the fact that human rights institutions have become tools for particular political 









                                                          
29 For more information, see: Kirsten Hastrup: Human Rights on Common Ground: The Quest for Universality 
(2001)    
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5. Anti anti-relativism 
 
     
     At least since the 1980s, there has been a degree of backlash in the academic sphere towards 
the stance of cultural relativism, and anthropology as its main haven. Clifford Geertz notices this 
rise of the anti-relativist intent and he analyzes why this issue is raised at this particular time. As 
his beliefs lie somewhere between the cultural relativism and universalism, he does not defend 
the cultural relativism stance explicitly, instead, he counters the attack with his criticism on the 
raising anti-relativistic intent. Geertz proposes a notion of ‘anti anti-relativism’ which 
recuperates cultural relativism through the perspective of universalism. Geertz presents these 
ideas in his Distinguished Lecture: Anti Anti-Relativism (1984).  
Geertz notes that the raising “fear” (Geertz 1984:263) of cultural relativism is notable in the 
current period. Geertz uses quite an evocative language in this regard; he describes the situation 
with a metaphor wherein he impersonates cultural relativism as a “Dracula” and anti-relativism 
is a “protective cross” (Geertz 1984:272). For Geertz, the fear of cultural relativism is no more 
founded than the fear of Dracula. He presents anti-relativists’ criticism which states that the 
“moral and intellectual consequences that are commonly supposed to flow from relativism - 
subjectivism, nihilism, incoherence, Machiavellianism, ethical idiocy, esthetic blindness, and so 
on - do not in fact do so and the promised rewards of escaping its clutches, mostly having to do 
with pasteurized knowledge, are illusory” (Geertz 1984:263). Geertz says that anti-relativists’ 
critique is unfounded, and explains that their (universalist) knowledge production is 
“pasteurized”, meaning that they tend to over-generalize and over-simplify concepts, discarding 
all the details and differences.  
On the other hand, Geertz distinguishes himself from cultural relativism, because it is “a drained 
term anyway, yesterday’s battle cry” (Geertz 1984:263). Almost a century ago, anthropologists 
secured cultural relativism position in anthropology, reacting to essentializing ideas posed by 
evolutionists of the time. The paradox in his view is that in this particular time we live in, we 
should improve anthropological theory, not regress with it. 
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Geertz emphasizes, being in favor of anti anti-relativism, that he does not want to defend or 
accept cultural relativism. His goal is to criticize anti-relativism. He uses logical analogy of 
abortion controversy: “Those of us who are opposed to increased legal restrictions on abortion 
are not, I take it, pro-abortion, in the sense that we think abortion a wonderful thing and hold that 
the greater the abortion rate the greater the well-being of society; we are "anti anti-abortionists" 
for quite other reasons I need not rehearse” (Geertz 1984:263,264). Geertz rhetoric enables him 
to “reject something without thereby committing oneself to what it rejects” (Geertz 1984:264).  
Geertz believes this discussion is important for anthropology because the concept of cultural 
relativism was “grandly ill defined” (Geertz 1984:264). However, a lot of unfounded criticism 
and misleading debates result from the misunderstanding of cultural relativism. Historically, 
anthropology as a discipline is not relativist in itself: “It has not been anthropological theory, 
such as it is, that has made our field seem to be a massive argument against absolutism in 
thought, morals, and esthetic judgment ; it has been anthropological data: customs, crania, living 
floors, and lexicons” (Geertz 1984:264). Geertz claims that anthropology, i.e., cultural relativism 
as an opposition to universalism is not embedded in theory itself. It became such through the 
actual experience and practice. He implies that relativistic approach towards difference was (and 
still is) the only way that anthropologist developed to deal with this issue. In today's global world 
interactions between different cultures are more and more common and cultural relativism 
should be used as a vessel for those interactions, through a promotion of cultural understanding. 
Moreover Geertz argues that anti-relativists in their criticism wrongly perceive relativist position, 
and equate it with nihilism. Anti-relativist proposed theories which produced controversies in 
anthropology. For example, anti-relativists believe that cultural relativists' nihilism is so extreme 
that they consider “Hitler as just a fellow with unstandard tastes” (Geertz 1984:264). This way of 
thinking is misguided, as I already discussed. Relativists can still be scholars, without the 
implication that they approve or are passive when it comes to social injustice or human rights 
abuses in different cultures. 
       Geertz suggests that there are anthropologists who place ''morality beyond culture and 
knowledge beyond both” (Geertz 1984:276). For him, this way of thinking more often than not 
leads to strengthening the existing differences or even making new ones. He implies that 
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universalistic declarations easily lead to essentialist condemnations, which then lead to complete 
misunderstanding. Geertz asserts that the role of anthropology is to tackle and draw attention to 
the most controversial issues, to “keep world off balance… [and that] it has been the office of 
others to reassure; ours to unsettle” (Geertz 1984:275). However, he  also argues that sometimes 
anthropologists were too eager to fulfill this role, that it lead to misconceptions: “We have, no 
doubt, on occasion moved too far in this direction and transformed idiosyncrasies into puzzles, 
puzzles into mysteries, and mysteries into humbug” (Geertz 1984:275).   
In conclusion, anthropologists of the time were too focused on ‘unsettling’ the binary opposition 
between cultural relativism and anti-relativism i.e. universalism, instead on concentrating their 
efforts to ‘settle’ on common grounds between the two schools of thought which then would 
have led to the development and improvement of anthropological theory, as well of its practical 
applications. It may be that it is possible that through this odd notion of ‘anti anti-relativism’ (as 
a form of Hegelian synthesis) which Geertz suggests that we can recuperate cultural relativism 







      Cultural relativism is a scholarly method developed in anthropology in order to properly 
approach the glocal socio-cultural differences. We should appreciate cultural diversity, 
especially when we come to a realization of how plural the world we live in is. Cultural 
relativism does not have to be just a scholarly stance, but should also be practiced in the form of 
everyday approach - not just as a way to deal with cultural ‘novelties’ but also as a way to 
rethink our activities and our surroundings, not taking them for granted. There are too many 
people still existing today who are not open to differences and do not see humanity as universally 
equal. In their heads they build up stigmas about others who do not fit their ideas of the ‘proper’. 
They establish and promote hierarchies by dividing humanity based on notions such as 
economical well-being, ethnicity, religion, or sexual preference, to mention a few. I find these 
criteria irrelevant in making distinctions between human beings but, unfortunately, these 
essentializing notions of differentiations may result in dreadful consequences. They are the main 
reason why many do not have drinkable water and roof over their head; in the name of 
essentialist notions such as nationalism, wars where hundreds of thousands of people die are 
waged every day. Current socio-political situation in the world obliges us to find ways to deal 
with these issues. This is why we need to consider the other side of the binary - to try to find 
some kind of universal principles applicable to all humanity through the incorporation of cultural 
difference. 
The way I reflect on the universality is twofold: one is scientific or anthropological where the 
focus is on the knowledge production in regard to how scholars understand the human through 
the perspective of the universal; and the other is more concerned with political effectiveness, in 
global problem solving, as related to cultural difference. In order to understand socio-cultural 
differences between the people scholars have to challenge the essentialist ways of 
conceptualizing the culture. We are social and cultural beings with fluid and multiple identities; 
hence we should not overlook the differences and similarities between and within the various 
cultural groups while keeping in mind their histories. Cultures of which we are a part of are 
dynamic, adaptive and porous so they must be studied in that manner. Every so often these 
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conditions are overlooked in the greater need of political freedom and self-empowerment. Often, 
essentialization happens non-intentionally, and with disregard for its consequences.  
Herein lies the reason why we need some concrete universal setting to coordinate effectively the 
inequality and injustice in the world and engage in grater future. We can attain such universality 
only if we consider it as a continuous ‘performative’ and dialogic process between and within the 
dominant and the subaltern, and between the global and the local. Human rights discourse can 
provide such a universal medium if such a reconciliation between the universal and the particular 
is established. This can be possible through a conversation including all the voices, and with 
more diligent political activism of experts from the anthropological field. We do not need to 
choose the sides of the divide between cultural relativism and universalism, but to surpass it, 
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